Offended by Offence

Frances Widdowson, Ph.D., Department of Policy Studies, Mount Royal University, 4825 Mount Royal Gate SW, Calgary, Alberta T3E 6K6, Email: fwiddowson@mtroyal.ca, Telephone: 403-440-6884

February 14, 2010

Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, 350 Albert Street, Ottawa, ON K1A 1H5

Dear Colleagues,

I am a political scientist who studies aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations, and I would like to comment on the second draft of Chapter 9 of the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS).  Quite frankly, I find this chapter very disturbing and a threat to the principles of sound academic inquiry.  The threat lies in the Chapter’s attempt to politicize research, resulting in the justification of the suppression of findings that are contrary to the agenda of various aboriginal political organizations.  In fact, Chapter 9 seems to be much more interested in pandering to the political concerns of the aboriginal leadership than in ensuring that research is conducted in an ethical manner.

The politicization of research is apparent in the first paragraph of Chapter 9, when it states that the recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Canadian Constitution “implies an ethical duty for those involved in research to acknowledge and support the desire of Aboriginal Peoples to maintain their collective identities and the continuity of their cultures”.  This statement confuses politics with ethics.  It should be recognized that the Constitution Act, 1982 was the result of a great deal of political gamesmanship (the reference to the “supremacy of God” in this document, for example, was incorporated because a number of evangelical Christians lobbied the government of the time, but this does not mean that researchers should be required to “acknowledge and support the desire” of these groups to assert the existence of “God”). Therefore, it is very dangerous to try to impose this political agenda on researchers.  What if a researcher finds that the maintenance of certain aspects of “collective identities” and “the “continuity of…cultures” are socially destructive? Should they be prevented from documenting this in their research?  Chapter 9 notes that “Aboriginal peoples are particularly concerned that research should enhance their capacity to maintain their cultures, languages and identities as distinct peoples and to facilitate their full participation in and contribution to Canadian society”, but this is a political argument and not the basis for a scientific research agenda.  What if the aboriginal “capacity to maintain their cultures, languages and identities as distinct peoples” conflicts with “their full participation in and contribution to Canadian society”?  Should a researcher avoid coming to this conclusion even if it is warranted by the evidence?

More specifically, there are two areas of the TCPS that are particularly destructive to the acquisition of knowledge about aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations.  One involves “community control” over research.  The second pertains to assertions that “Indigenous knowledge systems” should be “respected” by researchers.

With respect to “community control” over research, Chapter 9 notes that “while continuing to respect individual autonomy, this Policy acknowledges the role of community in shaping the conduct of research, in particular, research that affects First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples”.  To achieve this end, it is maintained that “collaborative research should be relevant to community needs and priorities and should benefit the participating community as well as extend the boundaries of societal knowledge”.  Research, therefore, “should be relevant and have the potential to produce valued outcomes from the perspective of the community and its members”.

But what if the “role of the community in shaping the conduct of research” conflicts with “respect [for] individual autonomy”?  And what if “community…priorities” are intent on opposing “extend[ing] the boundaries of societal knowledge”?

These statements in Chapter 9 are completely oblivious to the possibility that “community control” over research can be used to oppose the acquisition of knowledge.  This has been seen in two of the examples referred to in Chapter 9 – the “violation of community norms regarding the use of human tissue and remains” and the “dissemination of information that… stigmatized whole communities”.  With respect to the use of “human tissue and remains”, some aboriginal leaders have tried to obstruct the study of ancient skeletons because it was feared that this knowledge would challenge their claims to the land based on original occupancy (the case of Kennewick man, for example). Finding the Long Ago Person Found skeleton even resulted in the remains being cremated in a “spiritual ceremony”, resulting in the destruction of a priceless piece of archaeological data that could have been used indefinitely to increase knowledge about the people living at that time.  The research of Spencer Wells into genetics also has been obstructed because a number of aboriginal leaders did not want their creation myth to be refuted with DNA evidence.  In addition, concerns about “stigmatization” have been used to suppress research on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, AIDS in native communities and reserve corruption.  The muzzling of these research findings under the guise of “community control” has prevented an understanding of the seriousness of these problems and the urgency of the policy response needed.   

These problems about “community control” of research are related to the other major difficulty found in Chapter 9 – the dictate that research findings should be interpreted “in the context of cultural norms and traditional knowledge”.  It is maintained that researchers should “respect…Indigenous knowledge systems by ensuring that distinct world views are represented wherever possible…”, but “indigenous knowledge”  is defined as including “feelings”, “spirit”, “the land as a living entity that reveals the way to living a good life”, and “spirituality expressed in traditional or Christian practices, relationships with ancestors and responsibilities to future generations”.   With this definition, Chapter 9 is confusing knowledge with belief, and is therefore mandating researchers to accept untrue beliefs and opinions as “knowledge”.  This will not have the effect of “extend[ing] the boundaries of societal knowledge”, but the opposite.

Chapter 9 refers to circumstances where there has been a “devaluing of Indigenous knowledge as primitive or superstitious”, but there are numerous examples of “Indigenous knowledge” where such a label would be appropriate.  Throwing beaver fetuses into the water so that they can be “reborn” is just one such instance.  This is a belief that existed before the development of scientific wildlife management practices, and it could, therefore, be characterized as “primitive”.  Also, the definition for “superstition” is the following: “an irrational belief that an object, action, or circumstance not logically related to a course of events influences its outcome” or a “belief, practice, or rite irrationally maintained by ignorance of the laws of nature or by faith in magic or chance”. The views of some aboriginal people, like all who believe in the supernatural, can be characterized as such.  Why should researchers be prevented from making such an accurate declaration if the beliefs in question are consistent with this dictionary definition?

The demand that that research findings should be interpreted “in the context of cultural norms and traditional knowledge” is very destructive to the research process and will result in the acceptance of research findings that are not supported with evidence.  This has the capacity to undermine research that is being undertaken in all academic disciplines.  In the case of political science, for example, pressure to accept the viewpoints of certain aboriginal people as “knowledge” is already resulting in the acceptance of incorrect information in our discipline.  One example concerns claims about the “Iroquois Constitution”.  Aboriginal political scientists like Kiera Ladner, for example, maintain that the Iroquois political system influenced the American Constitution, despite the paucity of evidence to support this contention.   Arguing that aboriginal viewpoints must be accepted as “knowledge”, however, is preventing these dubious claims from being subjected to scholarly criticism.

Another example concerns the claim by the aboriginal “oral historian” Stephen Augustine.  According to Augustine, his “reading” of a wampum belt indicated that it was a component of the “Mi’kmaq Constitution”.   An in depth investigation of the matter by the University of Toronto anthropologist Alexander von Gernet, however, found that the belt had nothing to do with the Mi’kmaq, but had actually belonged to a French aboriginal group that gave it to the Pope as a present.  In this case, would the dictate to “respect…Indigenous knowledge systems by ensuring that distinct world views are represented wherever possible…”, mean that researchers would have to put forward Augustine’s highly suspect “interpretation” as a form of “knowledge”?   If so, how would the two “world views” be reconciled in terms of trying to understand the actual nature of the wampum belt or the political traditions of the Mi’kmaq?

Chapter 9 needs to determine its purpose.  Is its goal to appease the political demands of aboriginal organizations or increase knowledge in academic disciplines?  These two objectives are often incompatible with one another.  As has been shown above, mandating aboriginal “community control” over the research process and respect for “Indigenous knowledge” often results in incorrect ideas being incorporated into academic disciplines such as political science.  Not only will this seriously undermine scholarship on aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations; it is also condescending to aboriginal people and prevents them from becoming legitimate actors in the research process and actual contributors to social knowledge.

Sincerely,

Frances Widdowson

Below is a letter from Rhoda Howard-Hassmann to the Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics concerning Chapter 9 of the Tri-Council Policy Statement (I have also posted a PDF of this letter on the Ethics page of this blog).   Many very important points are raised in this letter, which will be of interest to all who study aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations.  I will also be providing my comments shortly to the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) and to the Interagency Advisory Panel (due March 1, 2010), and urge others to do the same.  Interestingly, Graham White, the President-Elect of the CPSA, wrote me on January 22, 2010 asking for feedback on Chapter 9 because he had been asked “to coordinate the Association’s reponse to one aspect of an important, ongoing process relating to the ethics regime for academic research in Canada”.  This request is somewhat surprising since I was intending to present a paper on this “important, ongoing process” at the CPSA’s 2010 Annual Meeting, but the organization decided that my paper did not “fit” within the program, and subsequently relegated it to a “poster” session.   Because of the CPSA’s recognition of the issue’s importance, one would think that it would jump at the chance to have the matter discussed on a panel, as well as having a scholarly paper on the subject posted on its website.

FW

***

February 5, 2010

Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, 350 Albert Street, Ottawa, ON K1A 1H5

Dear Colleagues,

I am pleased to have the chance to comment on the second draft of Chapter 9 of the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans. I am copying this letter to the Associate Vice-President, Research, at Wilfrid Laurier University, to the WLU Faculty Association (WLUFA), and to the CAUT.  These are my own comments, and should not be understood as the views of WLU, the WLUFA, or the CAUT.

Since the Panel intends to post comments on this draft on its website, I wish to clarify my own background before presenting my concerns. I am a scholar of international human rights; I have also been teaching comparative genocide studies for twenty-five years. Although I am not a scholar of aboriginal affairs, I believe that a strong and compelling argument can be made that Aboriginal Canadians are victims of cultural genocide. Thus, I believe that attempts to preserve their languages, indigenous religions, traditions, and cultures are very important. At the same time, however, I do not believe aboriginal communities should be essentialized as unchanging and without internal cleavages and disputes. Moreover, as a specialist in human rights I am concerned about academic freedom and freedom of speech as it pertains to research on Aboriginal communities, as it pertains everywhere else.

I am pleased to see that some of the problems I noted in my earlier letter to you of January 19, 2009 have been remedied. Some, however, remain, or new problems have emerged. While I agree with most of the principles set out in this version of Chapter 9, I am still worried about what happens in cases of conflicts of interests between communities and researchers, and conflicts between communities and individuals. I also have some concerns about aboriginal knowledge, and about some potential legal matters.

 Academic Freedom

 The Draft still sidesteps the question of whether a community can absolutely block a research project. There may be occasions when communities and researchers cannot come to an agreement on research. If this happens, does the researcher have the right to continue with her research—perhaps by contacting individual members of the community—or not?  Article 9:10, lines 3678 ff states that a community can engage nominally or not at all in research,  Can the community deny the researcher access? 

 The idea of “partnership” (e.g. line 3363) between scholars and research subjects assumes no conflicts, or conflicts that can be resolved with good will. One would hope that such resolution would be the case, most of the time. But if conflicts can’t be resolved, whose views take precedence if there are disagreements over questions, methods, results, or conclusions? Line 3468-69 notes Aboriginal communities have often not had the chance to correct misinformation or ethnocentric interpretations. While this is true, what onus, if any, is the Panel putting on researchers here to accept such corrections, if offered?  Does the researcher have the right to reject offered corrections? Article 9:17, lines 3870-77 imply that the researcher does have such a right: but the Panel should make it clear that the researcher is entitled to have the last word. Similarly, with regard to Article 9:11:, lines 3704-3705: If there are “mutual responsibilities” in analysis and interpretations, production of reports and dissemination of results, does the researcher enjoy the academic freedom to publish her own analysis and interpretations in event of disagreement? Does she enjoy the academic freedom to disseminate her findings wherever she wishes?

These matters must be clarified: as it stands, this draft waffles about what happens in case of conflict between researchers and aboriginal communities. If researchers do not enjoy the normal rights of academic freedom, then Chapter 9 should begin with an Article that states clearly that researchers on Aboriginal affairs do not enjoy these rights. As I stated in my letter of 2009, if the principles of academic freedom are to apply to all research except research about aboriginal communities, then this should be clearly stated so that researchers on aboriginal matters know they are operating under a different set of rules than they are used to.

 Individuals and Community

 This draft, like the earlier version, still assumes that individual aboriginal Canadians do not have the same rights to autonomy as all other Canadians. The foreword states that First Nation, Inuit and Métis communities, but not individuals from these communities, are invited to respond to the draft. A community is defined (line 3178-79) as “a collectivity with shared identity or interests that has the capacity to act or express itself as a group.” This definition ignores communities within which interests many not be shared, even if identities are.

Throughout, references are made to Aboriginal communities as if all Aboriginal individuals live in such communities. Many do not. How is research on urban aboriginals without ties to any Aboriginal community to be conducted? If, for example, a researcher wishes to conduct research on Aboriginal university graduates living in Toronto, how is she supposed to do so?

The phrase, “while continuing to respect individual autonomy” (l. 3139-40) is not sufficient to protect the autonomy of Aboriginal individuals, an autonomy considered in other parts of the Policy Statement as key to respect for all non-Aboriginal Canadians. The Policy does not yet clarify what a researcher is to do if the interests of the “community” (or those who represent it or purport to do so) do not coincide with the interests of individuals. Indeed, the Policy still does not present guidance on how researchers can by-pass community leaders to access individuals who may wish to participate in research that the community leaders do not wish to see conducted.

I repeat what I said in my letter of 2009: there must be some statement that aboriginal leaders or elders do not have the right to veto research in which individual aboriginals might be interested in participating. The possibility of not engaging with the community in some situations must be allowed; for example, if all the community leaders are members of extended family x, and do not want extended family y’s circumstances to be investigated, the researcher must be permitted to circumvent the community leaders and go directly to family y. Aboriginal leaders do not always serve the collective welfare of the individuals within their communities (l. 3239). Lines 3330-31- state that when the “welfare of relevant communities is not affected…informed consent of individuals is sufficient.” Who decides when the welfare of the community is affected? This statement presumes, once more, that community leaders enjoy the support of all members of the community and make decisions that do not adversely affect any community members. In no other Canadian community is this assumed. 

 The Chapter as a whole glosses over real and potential differences between individual and community interests. Acknowledgement of diversity among and within Aboriginal communities, and the statement that such diversity “increases the important of clarifying mutual expectations and obligations within the community” (line 3338-44) is facile, and does not confront the hard question of whose interests take precedence when there is conflict. The statement in lines 3389-93 that “First Nations, Inuit and Métis individuals…enjoy freedom of expression as does any other citizen [and that] “they are free to give informed consent…” is not strong enough.  This statement should be front and centre in this chapter and it should be made clear that potential research participants enjoy this freedom whether or not the welfare of the community is likely to be affected by their decisions and whether or not community leaders agree with their decision.

Similarly, the paragraph starting at line 3510 should be front and centre. It should refer not only to “subgroups” but to individuals, whether vulnerable or not.  It should clarify that research among these people should not be viewed as covert. The Panel should be supporting overt research in communities even when there are intra-community conflicts and especially when there are risks to participants. Canada is a democracy: no citizen should have to fear that her or his rights as an individual will be undermined because of her or his decision to participate in research. This paragraph is written as though Aboriginal communities are not legally obliged to protect their citizens’ individual rights.

The larger question here is whether Aboriginals are citizens of Canada, or only members of their own Aboriginal communities. If they are citizens of Canada, then they have the same right as any other citizen to make up their own mind as to whether to participate in a research project, irrespective of the wishes of community leaders. No other competent Canadian adult is obliged to take into account any opinion but her own before deciding whether to participate in a research project. If collective decision-making is merely a “complement” to individual decisions (l. 3272) in research projects on indigenous peoples outside Canada, then it should be clear throughout this document that within Canada as well, researchers may have direct access to individuals, who may make their own decisions about participation in research regardless of their community’s views. If, however, individual Aboriginals are to be denied the autonomy that all other competent Canadian adults are assumed to enjoy, that should be clearly stated at the outset of the Chapter. 

Indigenous Knowledge

 “Indigenous knowledge” is now defined as “holistic, involving body, mind, feeling and spirit” (lines 3208-09). As far as I can determine, however, this Draft still refers not only to statements of fact that are empirically verifiable according to normal scientific standards, but also to non-verifiable Aboriginal beliefs and myths, as knowledge. There is still no suggestion that this “knowledge” could be inaccurate. Yet academic freedom implies that any researcher can investigate anything an individual or a group claims to be its “knowledge”; we do not, for example, protect non-aboriginal Christians who insist on the empirical accuracy of their Biblical origin myth from academic inquiry into it, even if falsification of such a myth might undermine their Christian identity.  I find it patronizing that this Draft assumes that Aboriginal Canadians—alone among all the peoples of the world—are incapable of withstanding normal academic challenges to what they construe to be knowledge, and incapable of differentiating between verifiable scientific knowledge and unverifiable beliefs or myths.

Moreover, I question the statement (l. 3211-12) that “indigenous peoples value their relationship with the land as a living entity that reveals the way to living a good life.” This may be true of many indigenous (as well as some non-indigenous) individuals, but it is a romanticized view of many others, some of whom live in such situations of severe poverty and social dislocation that their relationship (if any) with the land is unlikely to figure largely in their worldview.  That such poverty and social dislocation is a consequence in large part of past Canadian genocidal and colonial policies does not mean that all indigenous people would, if they could, value their relationship with the land. Aboriginal knowledge is here essentialized as a consequence of an undifferentiated, romantic view of Aboriginal people that does not take account of social reality.

As a minor point, why assume that indigenous Canadians can express their spirituality only through traditional or Christian practices? Does the Panel possess evidence that no spiritual indigenous person practices any other religion?

Legal Matters

Surely the statement that Article 9.1, (a), lines 3300-3302, applies to “lands over which a claim has been asserted but not settled,” is too broad. What about non-Aboriginals living on such land, as in the current concern over land claims in Caledonia, Ontario? Are researchers to be precluded from access to such individuals because the land claim is not settled?  Does the Panel have the authority to pre-judge legal claims in this manner, making authoritative statements about the responsibilities of researchers based on hypothetical outcomes of legal cases? 

Also regarding Article 9; 1, lines 3310-3311. Canada did not vote for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). Surely this should be noted, whether one agrees with Canada’s negative vote or not. How can a publicly funded organization refer Canadian researchers to an international document that the Canadian government has not accepted, without noting that fact?

Article 9:18 re intellectual copyright. Has the Tri-Council Panel come up with proper guidelines on this? Individual researchers in fields such as anthropology probably do not have the capacity, even with complete good will, to negotiate appropriate intellectual property guidelines. Do individual REBs now have the responsibility to assist researchers in copyright matters? This is an extremely complex legal field. Legal advice is absolutely necessary to both researcher and the Aboriginal group concerned. Theft of traditional plant knowledge by private corporations, for example, is now common in many indigenous communities. Are there budget lines in the three Councils’ grant applications for the researcher(s) to seek appropriate legal advice? If so, will these budgets cover the costs of consulting with lawyers who may well charge up to $1,000 per hour?

Surely the three councils should be drafting a document with legal guidelines, having consulted with top-flight intellectual property lawyers, separate from the Research Ethics document, on the problem of intellectual copyright?

Smaller questions/concerns

Article 9.1: does this refer only to research on human subjects, or is it meant to apply, e.g. to statistical research about Aboriginal Canadians?

 Article 9.8 line 3555-56. Are Aboriginal cultures predominantly oral in 2010? Surely most Aboriginal Canadians are literate and many if not most of their laws, if not customs, are written down?

Article 9:14. I agree that research projects should support the enhancement of skills, education and training of Aboriginal peoples. However, do the individual granting agencies now have budget categories to make such training possible? Are there budget lines to cover costs such as feasting and gift-giving (lines 3822-28), which in other contexts would be considered illegitimate bribery?

I hope that the Panel will find my comments useful.

Yours sincerely,

Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann

Cc. Dr. Paul Maxim, Associate Vice-President, Research, WLU

      Dr. Judy Bates, President, WLUFA

      Dr. Jim Turk, CAUT

Stuart Soroka, the 2010 Programme Committee Chairperson for the CPSA, had a message posted on the Women’s Caucus listserve before it was moderated (see Email from Stuart Soroka – January 4 on the Ethics page of this blog).  In this message, Soroka assured members of the Women’s Caucus that my paper was transferred to a poster session because it “did not easily fit into a panel with other papers from the REIPP [Race, Ethnicity, Indigenous Peoples and Politics] section”.  He goes on to point out that the “the committee approved of the decision (as the committee must approve of all section heads’ decisions for CPSA conferences)” and that “the charge of any unprofessionalism on [Kiera Ladner’s] part is, to be frank, wholly unfounded”.

While “the charge of any unprofessionalism” could very well be without merit (it was merely noted that Ladner “seems to have left herself open to a charge of unprofessionalism”, and this suspicion was based on Ladner’s previous inability to be objective about my work on aboriginal policy), there are a few things that should be mentioned in response to the committee’s decision about my proposal’s lack of “fit” within the REIPP section.  I have been told that the CPSA, in the past, has been concerned about placing me on a panel with other scholars who study aboriginal politics out of fear that my ideas could create a hostile reaction (a circumstance that was realized at the 2008 conference).  The creation of the REIPP section has exacerbated this problem because it has tended to move presentations about aboriginal peoples and aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations out of more traditional academic sections (comparative politics, Canadian politics, etc.), and into a section that is influenced by an “identity politics” orientation.  Therefore, the idea of “fit” could have more to do with trying to avoid conflict than with academic considerations.

Second, it seems odd that the CPSA would not want to have a proposal concerning research ethics and aboriginal peoples, aboriginal epistemology, etc., discussed in a formal panel.  The CPSA devoted a section of its report on research ethics to “Research involving Aboriginal peoples”, and the second draft of the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans’ chapter concerning “Research Involving Aboriginal Peoples in Canada” has just been released for scholarly consideration.  Brock et al., in their letter “Racism, chilly climate, our responsibility and the discipline”, even suggested that a “major CPSA *Plenary on Responsibility Difference and the Discipline* might be productive” and “would attract a phenomenal attendance and would generate the kind of constructive professional debate we desire within the CPSA, and would be a mentoring opportunity for graduate students and junior faculty” (the people recommended for the plenary, however, did not come from a wide range of perspectives and were largely supportive of the existence of different “ways of knowing”). 

Past CPSA sessions also have sparked considerable interest in these topics.  The panel that Albert Howard and I participated in with Sandra Tomsons in 2009 was packed and led to a lively, but restrained, discussion.  Kiera Ladner’s proposal last year entitled “Decolonizing the Discipline: Respecting Indigenous Knowledge & Using Indigenist Methodologies” was also accepted.  The abstract for this presentation was as follows:

“Since Columbus was discovered, knowledge of the Americas and the peoples who lived there captured the minds and imaginations of some of Europe’s greatest political philosophers: More, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Spencer, and Engels, to name but a few. Despite the fact that Indians of the Americas have occupied the imaginations of the world since the time of ‘discovery’, Indians have not occupied the imaginations of modern political scientists. Political science has ignored Indigenous political traditions and studied contemporary Indigenous politics only from the vantage point of the western-eurocentric tradition. Simply put, most have been unable to escape their paradigm paralysis to understand the politics of the ‘other’ on its own terms or as separate from the western-eurocentric experience. In so doing, political science has perpetuated a western-eurocentric understanding that virtually denies ‘others’ a voice within the discipline. This paper draws on the theoretical undertaking of my dissertation and updates the uncirculated paper presented at UofA (the abstract of which led to a heated exchange at CPSA). It engages the discipline’s construction of the Indigenous and argues that it is necessary to understand the ‘other’ not from the vantage of the western-eurocentric intellectual tradition as this readily perpetuates misunderstanding but from the vantage of their own intellectual and political traditions. It argues that proceeding as such enables a trustworthy post-colonial/decolonizing understanding of Indigenous politics within political science and that the effect of such a paradigm shift has the potential to be of great benefit to the discipline as a whole not just the study of Indigenous politics”.

A number of assertions put forward by Ladner still need to be analyzed and debated (for some reason, Ladner did not produce a paper fleshing out this abstract).  What are the “Indigenous political traditions” to which Ladner refers?  How do we “understand the politics of the ‘other’ on its own terms”?  And what is a “trustworthy post-colonial/decolonizing understanding of Indigenous politics within political science” and how will this “be of great benefit to the discipline as a whole not just the study of Indigenous politics”?  Once again, we seem to have the contradiction of saying that there should be a “different” understanding that only the identity group can have (i.e. it cannot be evaluated with universally accessible social scientific methods), yet this “understanding” must be accepted by all as a benefit to political science.

Ladner’s proposal was included in a workshop on “‘Race’, Racism and Anti-racism as Political Science: Framing and Re-Framing Relationships”, which also included presentations on “Race, Empowerment and Crisis Management: Black Political Leadership and Hurricane Katrina” and “Beyond Racial Exceptionalism: Explaining the Convergence of Mixed-Race Census Categorizations in Canada, the US and Great Britain”.  Interestingly, the two latter presentations are very dissimilar from Ladner’s and do not really concern epistemological matters.  Ladner’s presentation, in fact, would have “fit” much better with the presentations of Tomsons, Howard and myself, but, for some reason, Ladner was not included on our panel, which largely concerned epistemological questions.  Therefore, “fit” appears to be a very subjective determination of the programme committee.

It should be noted that unscholarly responses to work critical of the prevailing “aboriginal orthodoxy” have been occurring for quite some time, and so it should not really be surprising if this is continuing in my case. Radha Jhappan, for example, stated publicly that “fundamental racism” formed the basis of Tom Flanagan’s book First Nations? Second Thoughts even though no evidence was provided to sustain this accusation. Similar problematic conduct occurred when Flanagan’s book was awarded the Donald Smiley Prize. The chair of the jury, Gurston Dacks, quit when he was outvoted, displaying contempt for a process that he had agreed to participate in (rejecting it only when he lost the vote).  Joyce Green has noted that the political science community was “fractured” because the jury’s decision “implicated us all in rewarding something that many of us felt was deeply wrong” (Marci McDonald, “The Man Behind Stephen Harper”, The Walrus, October 2004, www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/the-man-behind-stephen-harper-tom-flanagan/5/).

Green’s comments reflect the deep problems that exist in political science with respect to the study of aboriginal peoples and aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations.  What is meant by saying that someone’s scholarship is “deeply wrong”?   Shouldn’t political scientists be concerned about the quality of the arguments and the amount of evidence that is being put forward to support them?  Unfortunately, the characterization of Flanagan’s work in moral terms has prevented a comprehensive analysis of his arguments.  Postmodern political scientists feel justified in dismissing Flanagan’s arguments as reprehensible, when engaging with them would help us all to more fully understand aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations.  One does not have to agree with arguments to critically analyze them; avoiding opposing viewpoints because one dislikes their preconceived implications, however, is anti-intellectual and is harmful to the academic integrity of the discipline of political science.

Subscribers to the Women’s Caucus listserve received a message yesterday with the following information:  “Due to the volume and content of recent messages on the WC-CPSA list serve, and following consultation with members of the WC, the WC-CPSA is now a moderated list-serve. Its purpose is to share information about job opportunities and future events of interest to WC subscribers”.  It is also noted that Janice Newton is the person who will moderate the listserve (see Email from Jane Arscott on the Ethics page of this blog).

And just when things were starting to get interesting.  I had posted a message (see Widdowson Letter to Women’s Caucus – January 4 on the Ethics page) in response to an email from Jill Vickers, who was warning Janet Ajzenstat about the perils of ”casting aspersions on a  colleagues’ [sic] professional  reputation using   this public medium without [key]  information” (see Email from Jill Vickers – January 3).  Then, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann told me she was intending to send a message to the listserve encouraging the Women’s Caucus to support the presentation of my work (see Email from Howard-Hassmann – January 4).  Unfortunately, members were prevented from receiving Howard-Hassmann’s message, which also provided some important criticisms of research ethics restrictions on the study of aboriginal peoples.

Now, I would be a little more open to the idea that the listserve is only supposed to “share information about job opportunities and future events of interest to WC subscribers”, if it had not been used for a month in 2008 to make libelous claims about my conduct.  “Casting aspersions” about my “professional reputation” was certainly not objected to; rather it appeared to be enthusiatically supported.  Janice Newton, the person now appointed to “moderate” the listserve even compiled the anonymous and unsubstantiated allegations that “overt and blatant racism” had been expressed at a CPSA panel – “aspersions” that were then distributed on the listserve and then made public on the Women’s Caucus’ website.

There is one other interesting piece of information in Arscott’s message.  It is noted that the decision to go to a moderated discussion occurred “following consultation with members of the WC”.  But who are the “members of the WC”?  All women in the Canadian Political Science Association?   All women who subscribe to the listserve?  I am a female member of the CPSA who subscribes to the listserve, but I was not consulted.  This means that “members of the WC” are actually a clique masquerading as the voice of women within the CPSA.

The battle with certain members of the Women’s Caucus of the Canadian Political Science Association appears to be entering a new phase.  In a posting on the Women’s Caucus listserve, the distinguished political science professor from McMaster University, Janet Ajzenstat, weighed in with the following (for the full posting see “WC email – Janet Ajzenstat” on the Ethics page of this blog):

“In a recent contribution Jill Vickers speaks of “an issue” but doesn’t elaborate [see  "WC email - Jill Vickers" on the Ethics page of this blog]. She apparently wants to settle an issue. Let me suggest two issues the Caucus might discuss. Neither can be easily settled.

The first is that Kiera Ladner seems to have left herself open to a charge of unprofessionalism. I may not be in possession of all the facts. Correct me if I am wrong. It seems – a number of people may conclude – that Ladner rejected Frances Widdowson’s submission for a panel presentation at the CPSA this spring because it criticizes Ladner’s research.

I’m in touch with Widdowson. I read her Mount Royal University blog. I understand that she was offered a poster session. For goodness sakes! She could fill an auditorium. She should have been invited to address the Congress at large.

Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry (with co-author Albert Howard) has attracted almost unprecedented attention in academe and in the public sphere. Widdowson and Howard are major contributors to what many see as the most important domestic problem in this country: the wretched poverty on some reserves, the appalling condition of housing, and aboriginal exclusion from Canadian political life. Not everyone agrees with the analysis in Disrobing, but the argument is extensive, well grounded, and must be addressed openly. A few panel presentations will not suffice. There will be – there should be – continuing exploration of Widdowson’s facts and arguments. She must be allowed to develop her argument and take it in new directions. We can expect years of fruitful debate.

The second – related -  issue is this: Widdowson is tackling the problem of cultural relativism. The book has additional gravity because it deals head on with one of the central philosophical themes of our age. The main outlines of the argument on cultural relativism are well established. I won’t rehearse them. “Aboriginal ways of knowing,” “women’s ways of knowing”: there is every reason to welcome discussion of the subject. Indeed it can’t be suppressed. It cannot be adequately pursued on a poster board.

Widdowson’s current research promises an investigation into the SSHRC’s insistence that research on aboriginal reserves be limited by respect for “aboriginal ways of knowing.” Let me urge the Women’s Caucus to endorse investigation of this topic. Widdowson writes (Mount Royal blog): ‘If the CPSA were really interested in open and vigorous debate, as it claims, it would organize a debate on aboriginal epistemologies in political science between Kiera Ladner and myself.’ I agree. I’d nominate Rhoda Hassmann as commentator/chair”.

Ajzenstat’s comments about cultural relativism are especially pertinent.  If it can be believed, it seems that the question “is criticism of cultural relativism racist?” is being answered in the affirmative by certain members of the Women’s Caucus of the Canadian Political Science Association.  Although there has been no substantiation of the anonymous allegations that “racist remarks” were made and “overt and blatant racism” was expressed in my presentation, a person attending the 2008 Women’s Caucus meeting inferred that it was my “critique of aboriginal epistemology which was racist and offensive” (see the “Email exchange between F and and L” on the Ethics page of this blog).  Because these members of the Women’s Caucus appear to assume that questioning the scholarly value of “aboriginal ways of knowing” is “racist”, they feel that it is appropriate to prevent this viewpoint from being discussed.

But does it make sense to argue that there are “aboriginal ways of knowing”?  To do so is to assume that ancestry (race?!) determines philosophy – a proposition that is actually racist.

This is not to argue the point, as Joanna Quinn has attributed to me (see Letter from Joanna Quinn on the Ethics page), that “aboriginal scholars have nothing to contribute simply because they are aboriginal”.  It is to state that all people, aboriginal and non-aboriginal, must use rigorous methods if they are to make a meaningful contribution to political science.   As I pointed out in “Native Studies and Canadian Political Science: The Implications of ‘Decolonizing the Discipline” (see the Advocacy Studies page of this blog), what is referred to as “aboriginal ways of knowing” in the Native Studies literature does not really constitute “knowledge” at all, since it asserts that subjective opinions are fact and maintains that unsubstantiated supernatural forces shape the nature of the universe.

On January 19, 2009, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights, Wilfrid Laurier University, sent a letter to the the Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics.  The letter was commenting on the revised Draft 2nd Edition of the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS), and it provides a number of criticisms of this document.  Because of the important contribution that this letter makes to the discsusion of research ethics, especially those concerning the study of aboriginal peoples, I have posted it on the Ethics page of this blog (see TCPS research ethics – Howard-Hassmann).

It should be noted that Howard-Hassmann’s criticisms relate to an earlier draft of TCPS, since the Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics has just released a revised version in November 2009 (www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/revised-revisee/chapter9-chapitre9/).  This revision involves chapter nine of the draft – “Research Involving Aboriginal Peoples in Canada”.  A review of this document indicates that many of Howard-Hassmann’s criticisms are still valid.  Because of the implications that this revised version has for academic freedom, it is important that people concerned about the rigorous study of aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations analyze this document and submit their comments to draft2e@pre.ethics.gc.ca by March 1, 2010.

The interest in developing special research guidelines for the study of aboriginal peoples began in 2002, when it was asserted that research involving aboriginal peoples should be “based on respect for Aboriginal knowledge, research modalities, and rights and needs”.  As Howard-Hassmann points out, the guidelines that came out of this concern are extremely problematic because they state that aboriginal peoples should be able to control all aspects of research that pertains to them.  Restrictions on research being undertaken with respect to aboriginal communities have been around for a while (for example, an editor at UBC Press told me a number of years ago that his publishing house had protocols in place that stipulated that “the community” had to approve research findings before they could be published), but what is changing is that these restrictions are now being formalized, and therefore will be imposed more widely and deeply across the country.

While it is important that research is controlled to try to prevent harm to individuals (in drug studies, for example), the restrictions being imposed on research being conducted with respect to aboriginal communities are much broader. What one sees is often not the protection of individuals from harm, but an attempt to prevent research that is threatening particular political interests. The result is that studies done in aboriginal communities are more advocacy than research.

This pressure to turn research into advocacy occurs in a number of ways. The first, as is mentioned by Howard-Hassmann, is the focus on “the community”. “The community” usually means the native leadership, and as a result, research that is threatening to those in power is censored. This has been happening informally for a number of years; Noel Dyck mentions that nepotism in aboriginal politics often is silenced out of concern for the image of “the community”. This problem is even greater when leaders are abusers of women and children; research that would document these circumstances often cannot be published, enabling powerful members of the community to oppress the vulnerable unopposed.

This is related to two other points that Howard-Hassmann mentions – preventing “division” and “stigmatization”. Promoting “harmony” in aboriginal communities often amounts to pressuring the marginalized and abused from rising up against their oppressors (as has occurred in many “sentencing circles”). Stopping “stigmatization” means the prevention of studies that indicate high levels of dysfunction. As Howard-Hassmann correctly points out, this inhibits a timely response to address serious social problems. In the case of research into Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) in B.C. for example, a study was halted because a high percentage of children were discovered to have been affected. This censorship is often justified under the guise that it is up to “the community”, not “outsiders”, to deal with the problem. But what if “the community” is in denial? Should the lives of future generations be sacrificed to appease “aboriginal pride”?

Another significant problem concerns, as Howard-Hassmann notes, the definition of “aboriginal knowledge” itself. As Albert Howard and I have also pointed out in Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry, much of what is referred to as “aboriginal knowledge” is not knowledge at all. It is often the unsubstantiated beliefs of certain members of the native population (usually elders). The result is the demand that assertions unsupported by evidence be accepted within the social sciences, and the questioning of these beliefs is met with all sorts of hostility and demands for censorship (as was shown by the reaction to my presentation on “indigenous methodologies” in June 2008 at the CPSA). The Bering Strait theory, the refutation of the assertion that the Iroquois influenced the American constitution, and the questioning of the claim that aboriginal peoples discovered hundreds of drugs now being used in modern pharmacology, etc., are vehemently opposed because a frank discussion of these ideas are perceived as a threat to aboriginal political aspirations. This has implications for a wide range of academic disciplines; even the scientific enterprise of archaeology is under threat because of the aboriginal “interest” in ensuring that thousand of year old skeletons should remain undisturbed.

There is one statement of Howard-Hassmann’s that requires much more discussion within the academic community. This is her assertion that “…the interests of aboriginal groups must be protected, given their long suffering under colonial and assimilationist policies…”. What are the “interests of aboriginal groups” and how do these differ from those of non-aboriginal people? Are these “interests” perceived as being in conflict with the research that is being undertaken in the social sciences and humanities? One often hears, for example, how science has been “harmful” to aboriginal communities, but no elaboration is provided. There needs to be much more detailed analysis of what such cases consist of, and when these accusations of “harm” constitute an attempt to prevent incovenient truths from being recognized.

On December 10, 2009, Dr. Keith Banting, the President of the CPSA, sent me a letter responding to a complaint that I had made to the Board of Directors (this letter is available on the Ethics page of this blog).  For those unaware of the events that transpired last year, a number of members of the Women’s Caucus of the CPSA posted anonymous allegations on the their website that “overt and blatant racism was expressed” during a “panel on aboriginal politics”, and that “similarly offensive behaviours” had occurred at “previous CPSA meetings” (http://www.cpsawomen.ca/lucheon/index.htm.  The examples given of “offensive behaviours” were that members were called “squaws” and “similar offensive language was used”.  There was even a “discussion of whether this was ‘hate speech’ under the criminal code”.  Although I was not named on the website, I was specifically mentioned in discussions on the Women’s Caucus listserv (see the letter from Joanna Quinn posted on the Ethics page), and I was identified as the person being complained about on Janet Ajzenstat’s blog “The Idea File” (http://janetajzenstat.wordpress.com/2008/08/28/harvey-mansfield-on-canada/). 

Although there has been no substantiation of the “overt and blatant racism” that I supposedly expressed, a letter was submitted by Kathy Brock, Joyce Green, Kiera Ladner and Malinda Smith to the CPSA Board asserting that “the CPSA needs to address racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia”, as well as “scholarship…which suggest[s] that racism must be protected by academic freedom”.  They also obliquely refer to the fact that “similar views [to a "junior woman scholar"] have been expressed by senior male scholars (and in one case have been awarded)”, without any elaboration of what these “views” are or if/how they are racist or responsible for promoting a hostile environment (see the “Racism, chilly climate, our responsibility and the discipline – Brock et al” on the Ethics page).  These assertions, along with discussions that occurred on the Women’s Caucus listserv (see “Women’s Caucus emails” on the Ethics page on this blog), led to a motion requesting the CPSA to “create policy concerning (1) speech that promotes hatred or creates a hostile environment; and (2) the consequences of such speech. In particular, we would like guidelines concerning professional conduct during the Annual Meeting (for panels and all other formal and informal sessions). These guidelines should include instructions for session chairs, participants and discussants. We also request the establishment of protocols for registering complaints and a process for their resolution”.

Dr. Banting’s letter tells me that there is currently nothing that can be done about the remarks legitimized by the Women’s Caucus since the CPSA does not have a complaints procedure in place for investigating individual members (although such a procedure will be discussed by members in June after the CPSA’s Committee on Professional Ethics releases its report).  My concern, however, is not so much the actions of individual members, but the fact that they are using the Women’s Caucus – an organization that is affliated with the CPSA – to make anonymous and unsubstantiated allegations.  Although the CPSA may not have the authority to police the behaviour of its members, surely it has the capacity to ensure that its affiliates are conducting themselves in an ethical and professional manner.  The actions of the Women’s Caucus of the CPSA, in fact, seem to condone libel.  Why doesn’t the CPSA rein in its Women’s Caucus?  Is it afraid to “offend” the postmodern sisterhood?

On November 7-10, in Montreal, a conference is being held on Religion in Quebec.  Of particular significance is the “Issues for Canada’s First Nations Peoples” panel, on Sunday from 1-2:30 p.m.   The papers being presented include the following:

Mark F. Ruml, University of Winnipeg
Respectful Methodology: Ethical and Procedural Guidelines for Aboriginal Research

This paper presents the conclusions of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Research Development Initiative. The purpose of the project was to develop, through interviewing Aboriginal Elders, a set of ethical and procedural guidelines for Aboriginal research, grounded in Aboriginal language and worldview concepts. The results are uniquely tailored to fit research directly related to Aboriginal cultural groups in Manitoba, Northwestern Ontario, and Saskatchewan but are of value and relevance to Aboriginal research in general. Research has revealed that the Dakota concept mitakuye owasin (“All my relations”) and the Ojibwe concept gagige inakonige (“eternal natural law”) are central concepts expressing cultural values and ethics important for guiding research. In both of these concepts, “respect” is the underlying cultural value, hence the title “Respectful Methodology.” This paper provides a unique contribution to the emerging discourse related to Aboriginal research ethics and procedures.   

David Walsh, Arizona State University
Canada’s Traditional Knowledge Policy and Problems of Intercultural Dialogue 

In 1993 the Government of the Northwest Territories of Canada developed the first Traditional Knowledge Policy. The policy incorporates traditional knowledge assessments into government programs and services. This breakthrough in intercultural exchange publicly legitimizes indigenous worldviews in contemporary affairs. However, it is also bringing to light inherent misunderstandings by non-native people of indigenous religious worldviews, and more importantly the inability of governmental agencies and corporations to incorporate the traditional knowledge being presented in meaningful ways. Through analyzing transcripts of traditional knowledge assessments I will highlight the underlying epistemologies in statements made by First Nations people. This is contrasted to Frances Widdowson and Albert Howard’s criticism of the traditional knowledge policy in ‘Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry,’ 2008. My paper will explore the epistemological assumptions of the various parties, demonstrating how the policy brings to the forefront the problem of miscommunication that has plagued exchanges between First Nations and non-native peoples.  

Suzanne Owen, Leeds Trinity
Sources of Contemporary Mi’kmaq Spirituality  

Many Mi’kmaw spiritual leaders spoke of learning ceremonies from neighbouring and Plains Indian peoples. The Conne River Mi’Kmaq of Newfoundland host an annual powwow in July conducted according to established protocols. As evidenced in the powwow itself, centred on dance displays and ceremonies that have Plains Indian origins, individual testimonies also indicate an extensive inter-tribal sharing of traditional knowledge and ceremonies from spiritual leaders belonging to Mohawk, Cree and other First Nations. In turn, Mi’kmaq are sharing their ceremonies with Labrador Inuit and other visitors. As well as challenging the category ‘indigenous religion’, this paper examines the question of indigeneity itself, particularly in the Newfoundland context where, until recently, only the extinct Beothuk were considered ‘aboriginal’.