The injustice of Victim Impact Statements
January 20, 2010
There is an interesting story in The Globe and Mail about a sentencing hearing for the killer of Hunter Brown, an elderly man stabbed to death while delivering Christmas cards (Romina Maurino, “Outpouring of grief at killer’s sentencing hearing”, January 19, 2010, p. A7). The article inadvertently raises questions about the nature of the Canadian justice system when it is noted that six relatives and neighbours gave Victim Impact Statements “to describe the anguish they have suffered since finding the beloved grandfather, described as a warm and gentle man, laying in a pool of blood, undelivered cards at his side”.
According to the John Howard Society of Alberta, “Canadian legislation concerning Victim Impact Statements was proclaimed in force in October, 1988″. This legislation, Bill C-41, ”allows victims to describe in writing the harm done to them or the loss suffered as a result of the crime” and also requires the court ”to take statements into consideration for the purpose of determining sentence…” (http://www.johnhoward.ab.ca/PUB/C53.htm#impact).
While this legislation is justified under the guise that it attempts to “meet the needs and interests of crime victims” by allowing them to be involved in the process, the John Howard Society points out that Victim Impact Statements have been opposed by those who “argue that their use makes sentencing an arbitrary process, shifting the focus from the offender to the victim”. Furthermore, critics argue that their use “creates classes of victims, leading to stiffer sanctions for those who offend against particularly eloquent, loved or upper class victims”.
What if Mr. Brown, for example, had not been a “beloved grandfather” and a “warm and gentle man”? Would this mean that his murderer should receive a more lenient sentence? By shifting the focus from the offender to the victim, sentencing becomes inconsistent with two principles that are fundamental to ensuring that there is equality under the law. These principles, described by Julian Roberts and Carol LaPrairie, are “proportionality” and “equity” – that “the severity of punishments should be directly proportional to the seriousness of the crimes for which they are imposed” and “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”.
It is perfectly reasonable to try to ensure that the victims of crime, such as the friends and family of Mr. Brown, receive whatever support they need to try to deal with the grief that they are experiencing. Sensitivity to the suffering of others, however, should not be used to justify a two-tiered justice system. The poor, orphaned and despised deserve the same legal treatment as the rich and popular. Victims should be able to express their pain as much as is necessary, but public grieving should not subvert the essential goals of a justice system – impartiality and fairness.